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THE EROSION OF PRIVATE LITTORAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: CITY OF LOS ANGELES
v. VENICE PENINSULA PROPERTIES
For over a hundred years, the California judiciary has closely scru-
tinized the state legislature's disposition of public tidelands.' Califor-
nia's tideland trust doctrine,' which protects the public's rights3 to
shoreland between low- and high-tide marks,4 is the primary basis
1. In 1855, the California Legislature made its first disposition of state lands. See
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine, 68 MICH. L. Rnv. 473, 524 (1969). This sale, which
included marshlands, swampland, and upland, arose out of lands granted California
by the federal government. See Act of Sept. 28, 1850, ch. 84, § 4, 9 Stat. 519, 520.
For a general history of California's acquisition and disposition of tidelands, see
Sax, supra, at 524-27; Comment, San Francisco Bay: Regional Regulation for its Pro-
tection and Development, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 728 (1967).
The California Legislature has periodically alienated tidelands for a variety of uses.
Act of July 15, 1961, ch. 1763, 1961 Cal. Stat. 3767 (general statewide interest grant
including provisions for snack bars and motels); Act of July 11, 1935, ch. 437, 1935
Cal. Stat. 1484 (grant to City of San Francisco for recreation, park, aquatic, and
boulevard purposes); Act of March 28, 1868, ch. 415, §§ 28-29, 1867 Cal. Stat. 514
(sale of salt marshland tidelands to settlers for one dollar per acre).
2. The tideland trust doctrine is a subset of the common law public trust doctrine.
Generally, the public trust doctrine may be characterized as "an area of law that gives
substantial protection to public rights and to public property." Dyer, California Beach
Access: The Mexican Law and the Public Trust, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 571, 582 (1972).
Highways, easements, waterways, and tidelands are included in a broad definition of
the "public trust." Historically, however, the scope of public trust law in the United
States has been narrower. The laws cover "that aspect of the public domain below
the low-water mark on the margin of the sea and the great lakes, the waters over those
lands, and the waters within rivers and streams of any consequence." Sax, supra note
1, at 556. California's tideland trust doctrine addresses tidewater susceptible to navi-
gation. Eikel, The Public Trust Doctrine and the California Coastline, 6 URB. LAW.
519, 523 (1974).
3. Traditional public rights to the tidelands include those of fishing, navigation,
and commerce. See Dyer, supra note 2, at 583. Modern additions to this list include
rights of general access and recreation. Id at 581-82.
4. Water law distinguishes between tideland, or littoral land seaward of high tide,
and upland, or littoral property not inundated by tides. The high-tide mark is not the
only line dividing tideland and upland. Some American decisions delineate the two
by use of a mean high tide or extraordinary high-tide mark. Borax Consol. v, Los
Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 22-26 (1935).
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for this scrutiny. Although the tideland trust doctrine has tradition-
ally governed only lands within the public domain,5 the California
Supreme Court in City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties6
expanded the doctrine to include semi-navigable, private tideland
never owned by the government.
In Venice Peninsula, the City of Los Angeles sought to enlarge a
privately-owned lagoon7 without exercising its power of eminent do-
main.' The city argued in its quiet title suit that the lagoon was sus-
ceptible to tides and thus was subject to the rights of the public.9 A
lower court traced the lagoon owner's title and concluded that the
lagoon was never part of the public domain." The court ruled that
such property was outside the public trust and dismissed the city's
5. See Sax, supra note 1, at 556.
6. 31 Cal. 3d 288, 644 P.2d 792, 182 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1982).
7. Id at 292-93, 644 P.2d at 794, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 601. Ballona Lagoon was a
shallow body of water isolated from the Pacific Ocean by a thin strand of beach sand.
At mean high tide, shallow-draft vessels were able to sail upon the lagoon. "Mean
high tide" is a rough average of a month's high tides. For two weeks out of each
month, the lagoon was totally unnavigable, and for the remaining weeks the lagoon
was navigable for only part of the day. Id
In 1839, when California was a part of Mexico, the governor of California granted
Rancho Ballona to the present owner's predecessors-in-title. Under the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, the Mexican grantees received a patent to the lagoon and sur-
rounding land. This property ultimately came into the possession of Venice Penin-
sula Properties, a real estate developer. Id at 294, 644 P.2d at 795, 182 Cal. Rptr. at
602.
8. Id at 292, 644 P.2d at 794, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
9. Id at 293-94, 644 P.2d at 794-95, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 601-02. The uses the city
envisioned for the properties included service as a flood barrier and as a recreational
facility. Id
10. City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Prop., 117 Cal. App. 3d 335,342, 172
Cal. Rptr. 619, 626 (1981).
The lower court held that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo separated the lagoon
from public domain lands. Id Under the terms of the treaty, the United States as-
sumed possession of all property held by the Mexican government. The treaty also
guaranteed the protection of Mexican citizens' private property:
In the said territories, property of every kind, now belonging to Mexicans not
established there, shall be inviolably respected. The present owners, the heirs of
these, and all Mexicans who may hereafter acquire said property by contract,
shall enjoy with respect to it guarantees equally ample as of the same belonging
to citizens of the United States.
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1848, United States-Mexico, art. VIII, para. 3,
9 Stat. 922, 929-30, - T.S. No. -. A subsequent act provided for the creation of a
board of commissioners who possess the power to issue patents to Mexican grantees.
This act also stipulated that "all lands the claims to which shall not have been
presented to the said commissioners within two years. . . shall be deemed, held, and
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suit. 1 ' On appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected this narrow
reading of the public trust doctrine. 2 The salient issue for the
supreme court was not whether the lagoon was ever part of the public
domain, but whether it was subject to a right of access' 3 under the
laws of Mexico or the United States.' 4
Public trust law in early England recognized public rights of fish-
ing and navigation in tidelands, or waters which "ebbed and
flowed."' 5 Although the English sovereign held title to these tide-
lands,' 6 he had no authority to alienate them. 7 Parliament, how-
considered as part of the public domain ... " Act of March 3, 1851, ch. 41, § 13, 9
Stat. 631, 633.
The forfeiture provision of the Act of March 3, 1851, received strong criticism in
both federal and California courts. See, e.g., Beard v. Federy, 70 U.S. 478 (1865)
(patent to Mexican grants is unnecessary for preservation of title); Minturn v.
Browden, 24 Cal. 644 (1864) (good Mexican title retains validity in spite of the Act).
11. 117 Cal. App. 3d at 342, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
12. 31 Cal. 3d at 298-300, 644 P.2d at 797-98, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 604-06.
13. The grant to Venice Peninsula Properties' predecessors-in-title provided that
the grantees "may enclose [Ballona Lagoon] without prejudice to the traversing roads
and servitudes." Id at 297-98, 644 P.2d at 797, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 604. This provision
preserved the rights of the public, and so the "title of defendants' predecessors was
subject to the interests of the public in the tidelands included in the grant." Id at 297,
644 P.2d at 797-98, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 605.
14. Id at 298, 644 P.2d at 797-98, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 605. A right of access would
pass to the United States as part of the sovereign interest transferred by the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo. See supra note 10. Those interests could then pass to the new
state of California in two ways: through a transfer of the public lands the United
States held in trust for the people of California territory, and through separate legisla-
tion. The most significant example of the latter transfer is found in an 1850 federal
grant of swamplands. See Act of Sept. 28, 1850, ch. 84, § 4, 9 Stat. 519, 520.
15. See generally R. HALL, ESSAY ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CROWN AND THE PRIV-
ILEGES OF THE SUBJECT IN THE SEA SHORES OF THE REALM (2d ed. 1875). For a
general history of the Roman law underlying early English common property law, see
W. BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW (2d ed. 1950).
16. Stevens, The Public Trust, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 195, 197-98, 206 (1972). Feudal
property law abhorred unowned property, so it was customary for the Crown to as-
sume possession of all public lands. The public had a general right to use such lands
for travel and commerce. Thus, public land of early England had the paradoxical
characteristics of divine, sovereign ownership and public use. Id at 206.
17. Id at 198. This inalienability of Crown lands reconciled the divine ownership
and public use of tidelands. Public use of tidelands, however extensive and for
whatever length of time, left the Crown's interests in those lands undiminished. The
explanation for this preservation was that "all things which relate peculiarly to the
public good cannot be given over or transferred. . . to another person, or separated
from the Crown." 2 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 17 (S.
Thorne trans. 1968).
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ever, was free to dispose of tidelands for legitimate public purposes.' 8
Although the English recognition of the public trust 9 guided
American decisions in the nineteenth century,20 the combined pres-
sures of geographic expansion and legislative abuses21 necessitated
the development of a new public trust doctrine. The seminal case in
the early evolution of this doctrine was Illinois Central Railroad v.
18. See Sax, supra note 1, at 475-76. Parliament, as the representative of the
English body politic, directed the utilization of public lands:
The ownership of the shore, as between the public and the King, has been settled
in favor of the King; but, as before observed, this ownership is . . . liable to
certain general rights of egress and regress, for fishing, trading, and other uses
.. . of his subjects. These rights are variously modified, promoted, or restrained
by the common law, and by numerous acts of parliament, relating to the fisher-
ies, the revenues and the public safety ...
R. HALL, supra note 15, at 108.
19. English law vested title to all tidal waters in the sovereign. Riparian owners
held title to lake and riverbeds free of the public trust. Only tidal waterways were
considered navigable for purposes of the public trust in England. State v. Superior
Ct. of Lake County, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 218, 625 P.2d 239, 243, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, 700
(1981). See generally R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, § 305.1 (2d ed. 1970)
(early history of common law public trust doctrine).
For an application of these principles in the U.S., see McManus v. Carmichael, 3
Iowa 1 (1856) (Mississippi River boundary case defining common law public trust).
20. See, e.g., Taylor v. Underhill, 40 Cal. 471 (1871) (tidelands patent was inalien-
able, modifications of foreshore were prohibited); Eldridge v. Cowell, 4 Cal. 80 (1854)
(state alone has power to manage tidelands); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. (1821) (river-
beds were Crown property, and thus passed to the U.S. upon British surrender of the
colonies).
21. Railroad companies held a particularly strong influence in the nascent Cali-
fornia Legislature:
By the time 152 prominent Californians met in Sacramento on September 28,
1878, to draft a new state constitution. . . people. . . had become aware. . . of
a great many abuses growing out of the sale of tidelands. . . the Central Pacific
Railroad had bought up all the frontage on the bay so that no other company
could erect a wharf without its consent . . . unscrupulous speculators had
purchased tide lots and then tried to force owners of the abutting dry lands to
pay extortionate prices for mud flats, in order to attain access to the bay.
"If there is any one abuse greater than another that I think the people of the
State of California has [sic] suffered at the hands of their law-making power, it is
the abuse that they have received in the granting out and disposition of the lands
belonging to the State," [a delegate] told the constitutional convention. Swamp
lands, tidelands, and marsh and overflowed lands had been taken in such vast
quantities, he said, that "now the people are hedged off entirely from reaching
tide water, navigable water, or salt water."
M. ScoTr, THE FUTURE OF SAN FRANcIsco BAY 9 (Inst. of Gov'tal Studies, Univ. of
Cal., Berkeley, Sept. 1963) (quoting debates and proceedings of the Constitution Con-
vention of the State of California, Sacramento, 1881).
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Illinois. 22 There the railroad contested the Illinois Legislature's re-
scission of its extensive gift23 of tidelands to the railroad.24  The
Supreme Court invalidated the gift and provided guidance on legisla-
tive abuse of the public trust:25 courts must scrutinize any govern-
mental conduct which reallocates public resources to private
ownership or limits public use of those resources.
2 6
Prior to the Illinois Central decision, California courts followed the
common law rule banning sales of tidelands.2 Previous decisions
invalidated patents28 of tidelands used for public navigation and fish-
ing.29 California courts, however, avoided a total invalidation of
alienation statutes by permitting limited sales of unproductive tide-
lands.3" This modicum of deference averted at least one early con-
frontation between the California Legislature and judiciary. In
22 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
23. Id. at 412-14. In 1869 the Illinois Legislature granted the Illinois Central
Railroad, its successors and assigns, "all the right and title of the state of Illinois, in
and to the submerged lands constituting the bed of Lake Michigan, [extending into
the lake] for a distance for one mile .... Act of April 16, 1869, § 3, 1869 Ill. Laws
245, 246. Although the railroad had reclaimed a strip of the foreshore, or submerged
land between the high- and low-tide marks, from the lake, the Supreme Court held
that all the railroad's foreshore property remained subject to public use. 146 U.S. at
460,
24. 146 U.S. at 414-19.
25. The Court's invalidation of the 1869 grant went to the heart of the state's
obligation as public trustee:
The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people
are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to leave them
entirely under the use and control of private parties, except in the instance of
parcels mentioned for the improvement of the navigation and use of the waters
... than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government
and the preservation of the peace.
Id. at 453.
26. Id. at 452-60.
27. See supra note 19.
28. The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to alienate property of the
United States. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. A common means of disposal of prop-
erty was through a land patent. See State of Ala. v. State of Tex., 347 U.S. 272 (1955).
29. See, e.g., Kimball v. MacPherson, 46 Cal. 104 (1873) (grants of bargain-priced
tideland under Act of March 28, 1868, partially invalidated); Taylor v. Underhill, 40
Cal. 471 (1871) (patent of tidelands held voidable if transfer obstructed navigation);
People v. Morrill, 26 Cal. 346 (1861) (sale of tidelands is an aberration of common
law tradition).
Early California courts occasionally bypassed invalidation of disposal statutes by
simply holding grants voidable. See Taylor v. Underhill, 40 Cal. 471 (1871).
30. See, e.g., Ward v. Mulford, 32 Cal. 365 (1867) (court found that the intent of a
19841
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Kimball v. MacPherson,3  the California Supreme Court discussed
this deference to the legislature's power to alienate select public
lands.32 The Kimball court concluded that the state legislature was
well aware of its duty as public trustee and thus intended to alienate
only tidelands lacking public utility.33
California courts had difficulty applying the Kimball analysis of
public trusts to title disputes involving the property of Mexican grant-
ees.34 The problem first arose prior to Kimball in the early mineral
rights case of Moore v. Smaw.35 In Moore, the California Supreme
Court discerned a lack of congruity between Mexican and American
public trust law.36 The differences prompted the Moore court to pro-
disposal statute was the reclamation of swampland, thus within scope of the public
trust).
31. 46 Cal. 104 (1873).
32. Id at 107-08. In light of the sometimes egregious conduct of the California
Legislature, judicial brinksmanship required both fluency in rhetoric and a capacity
for irony. See supra note 21. The opinion in Kimball is emblematic of such
brinksmanship. The supreme court quoted from the district court judge's conclusions
of law:
[T]he [navigable tideland] sought to be purchased, in my opinion, is not of the
character that the Legislature intended to sell. Either the Legislature has estab-
lished a most pernicious system, or a good, wholesome one has been provided,
and this application, as well as many others, develops an attempt to apply it to a
purpose never intended by the Legislature.
46 Cal. at 104.
33. 46 Cal. at 107.
34. California courts were in general agreement over the trust interest held by the
State in public domain tidelands. See, e.g., Ward v. Mulford, 32 Cal. 365 (1867)
(exercise of sovereignty over tidelands was a public trust function, not a proprietary
action); Moore v. Smaw, 17 Cal. 199 (1861) (consonance between Mexican and
United States law required in transfers of sovereign interests). Some courts applied
the general rule of trust interests attaching to tidelands regardless of the origin of title.
Other courts observed the special legislative treatment given Mexican tidelands pat-
ents and made an exception to the general rule of the state's trusteeship. See Minturn
v. Brower, 24 Cal. 644 (1864).
35. 17 Cal. 199 (1861).
36. Id. at 218-19. In Moore, the primary issue was whether a patent issue under
the directives of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 10, conveyed mineral
rights with the soil. Mexican law reserved for the sovereign all subsurface rights in
private property. From these rights the Mexican sovereign derived a major portion of
his fiscal revenue. The dilemma before the California Supreme Court in Moore was
that the property owner stood to gain if mineral rights were transferred by patent, but
the State of California would violate the owner's constitutional rights if the mineral
rights were withheld. The court held that, notwithstanding the property owner's for-
tuitous windfall, the withholding of mineral rights was inimical to the spirit of United
States law. 17 Cal. at 226.
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pose a test for applying the public trust doctrine to the property of
Mexican grantees. The test required the existence of a trust interest
previously held by the Mexican sovereign,3 7 affirmation of a rough
congruence between prior Mexican public trust law and controlling
California law,38 and the preservation of all the grantees' property
interests. 39
A later California Supreme Court decision, FA. Hihn Co. v. City of
Santa Cruz,' abbreviated the Moore test4 ' by excising the require-
ment of parallel sovereign interests.42 The Hihn court concluded that
Mexican property law had only marginal utility in the California
tideland trust doctrine.43 Several courts subsequently criticized the
Hihn court's conclusions."
Apart from the difficulties with Mexican property interests, the
California courts faced additional problems in analyzing legislation
37 17 Cal. at 213.
38. Id at 225-26.
39. Id. at 212. The court concluded that a separation of mineral rights from a fee
estate was repugnant to the "spirit of our race and genius of our institutions." If
separation was effected by the patent, the court reasoned, the patent would have ex-
pressly indicated so. Id at 206.
40. 170 Cal. 436, 150 P. 62 (1915).
41. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
42. 170 Cal. at 443-45, 150 P. at 66. Hihn held that tidelands within the perimeter
of a pueblo founded under Mexican law were not governed by the ayuntamiento or
local governing body, but by the sovereign. The rights of public use passed, as did
rights attached to the public domain, to the United States upon Mexico's cession of
the Californias in 1848. Id at 444-45, 150 P. at 66-67. While the Hihn court ex-
amined pertinent Mexican law in some detail, it avoided basing its decision upon the
public trust interest held by the city as successor to its pueblo ancestor. Id at 445, 150
P. at 66. Although the Hihn court concluded that a sovereign trust interest did pass to
the State of California, it implied that those interests came directly from the sover-
eign, not through the ayuntamiento. Id at 445, 150 P. at 66-67. Thus, the Hihn court
used Mexican law to define a public trust interest existing before California's cession,
but it refused to interpret that interest in light of applicable restrictions arising from
the same corpus of Mexican law.
43. Id at 444, 150 P. at 66. The private tidelands involved in early tideland trust
cases were almost exclusively the property of Mexican grantees. See supra note 10
and accompanying text.
44 See. e.g., Borax Consol. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935) (duty of U.S.,
under Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, to protect all rights of property emanating from
the Mexican government prior to cession); Pike Rapids Power Co. v. Minneapolis, St.
P. & M. Ry. Co., 99 F.2d 902 (8th Cir. 1938) (responsibility of state to abide by provi-
sions of grant of public lands).
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that modified the public uses of tidelands.45 Until the decision of
People v. California Fish Co. ,46 the tidelands trust doctrine lacked a
standard for determining valid public use of tidelands.47 In Calf/or-
nia Fish, the California Supreme Court held that tidelands were
freely alienable subject to the public trust.4" Although the supreme
court adopted elements of the rigorous scrutiny test applied in Illinois
Central,49 it also made a significant innovation. The court ruled that
legislation proposing new uses for tidelands is valid if those uses pro-
mote the aims of the public trust.50
The Calfornia Fish test added a new flexibility to California's tide-
land trust doctrine, but it failed to delineate the range of permissible
uses. 5  Later courts adopted the "water-related" doctrine52 to define
45. The chief concern of the court was the privitization of lands within the public
domain. See, e.g., City of Oakland v. Oakland Waterfront Co., 118 Cal. 160, 50 P.
277 (1897) (grant for the expansion of city boundaries upheld); Shirley v. City of
Benicia, 118 Cal. 344, 50 P. 404 (1897) (wharf built by city interfered with plaintiffs
access to properties, upheld as property use of trustlands); Ward v. Mulford, 32 Cal.
365 (1867) (any public use of tidelands not interfering with rights of navigation up-
held). California courts generally ignored legislative modifications of public uses of
tidelands. See generally Sax, supra note 1, at 524-30.
46. 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913).
47. Early tideland trust cases did differentiate between public works grants and
grants to politically influential but non-civic-minded individuals. The latter were
generally invalidated. See supra note 29. The former, however, were accepted by
courts because the grants specifically aspired to some valid public interest, often
drainage and filling of tidelands and marshlands. See Sax, supra note 1, at 528. The
absence of a judicial use standard stemmed more from the court's preoccupation with
fraudulent legislative conveyances of tidelands than from a lack of ripeness of the
issue.
48. 166 Cal. at 586, 594-97, 138 P. at 83, 86-88. In California Fish, the State of
California brought suit to quiet title to several parcels of tideland. The defendant
corporation held title to one parcel under a 1887 patent. The state's main argument
was that the common law prohibited alienation of any tideland, and so the defend-
ant's patent was void. While the California Supreme Court in Calfornia Fish ac-
cepted the state's argument in regard to alienation of useful tidelands, it pointed to
the judicial acceptance of sales of unproductive swampland and tideland. Id at 585,
138 P. at 82-83. Proper management of the public trust, the court concluded, involved
a judicial and legislative flexibility, not a doctrinaire adherence to common law rules.
Id at 597, 138 P. at 80.
49. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
50. People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. at 596, 138 P. at 87. It is worth noting,
however, the court's language on proprietary tidelands and swamplands: "When [fill-
ing] has been done in the regular administration of the trust, the land thus excluded
from use for navigation may be alienated irrevocably. . . for private use by private
individuals." Id
51. Part of the test's flexibility, of course, lay in its ambiguity. The Calfornia Fish
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these uses. 3 In Mallon Y. City of Long Beach,54 the California
Supreme Court defined a "water-related" use as one that at least in-
directly serves navigation or water recreation." Mallon applied the
"water-related" doctrine to a municipality's distribution of off-shore
oil revenues. 6 It found a valid distribution of tideland revenues was
one that equitably contributed to "water-related" uses.5 7 The court in
Mallon stipulated that a use must serve a broad, as opposed to a nar-
row, public interest. 8 Recent decisions have criticized Mallon's lib-
court did, however, provide some guidance in rephrasing the traditional public use of
navigation:
As the state has the powers necessary to the execution and administration of the
trust, it follows that it may dispose of [trustlands] ... as the interests of naviga-
tion may require. One of the duties of the trust is to adapt the land to the use for
navigation in the best manner. If, in so adapting the tide lands for this use, it is
found necessary or advisable, in aid of the use, to cut off portions of it from
access to navigable water ... the state has the power to exclude such portions
from public use....
Id at 597, 138 P. at 87-88.
52. See general4y Sax, supra note 1, at 532-38.
53. The California Fish court's language on the "interests of navigation" was an
articulation of the "water-related" doctrine. See supra note 51. For an example of
the ingenuity of courts in fleshing out the "water-related" doctrine, see Boone v.
Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 273 P. 797 (1928) (prospecting on public tidelands held to be
a valid use under the public trust doctrine). But see City of Grass Valley v. Walkin-
shaw, 34 Cal. 2d 595, 212 P.2d 894 (1949) (construction of a sewer was a municipal
affair outside the water-related uses of public trustlands).
54. 44 Cal. 2d 199, 282 P.2d 481 (1955).
55. Id at 206-08, 282 P.2d at 485-86.
56. Id at 209-10, 282 P.2d at 487.
57. Id at 205-08, 282 P.2d at 485-87. See also California ex rel. State Lands
Comm'n v. County of Orange, 134 Cal. App. 3d 20, 184 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1982) (reve-
nues from tidelands granted in trust to a county are not free of public trust, must serve
state interests); City of Long Beach v. Morse, 31 Cal. 2d 254, 188 P.2d 17 (1947) (city
is trustee of tidelands; income as well as corpus is subject to the trust).
Compared to the Wisconsin or Massachusetts public trust doctrine, the Mallon
standard of equitable distribution of tideland benefits allows municipalities more flex-
ibility to alter the character of the seabed and foreshore of public waters. Compare
Bach v. Sarich, 74 Wash. 2d 575,445 P.2d 648 (1968) (roadway beyond power of state
legislature as public trustee) and Sacco v. Department of Pub. Works, 352 Mass. 670,
227 N.E.2d 478 (1967) (widening of highways at expense of tideland not envisioned
by state legislature) and State v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 275 Wis. 112, 81 N.W.2d 71
(1957) (state held powerless to destroy character of lake, even for public purposes)
with Martin v. Smith, 184 Cal. App. 2d 571, 7 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1960) (transformation
of tidelands for construction of a restaurant, swimming pool, and other commercial
appurtenances was consistent with public trust aims).
58. Mallon distinguished between a "regional" public interest (e.g., sewers, mu-
nicipal buildings) serving a small group of state residents, and a "state-wide" or gen-
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eral definition of public tideland uses. 9
Expanding California municipalities have urged courts to apply
the tideland trust doctrine to private property. In the recent case of
City of Berkeley v. Superior Court ofAlameda County,61 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that property reclaimed from the ocean was
subject to public use.62 This decision, however, differed from previ-
ous reclamation decisions in that it considered the tideland owner's
expense in reclaiming the property.63  City of Berkeley carried for-
ward the Calfornia Fish scrutiny of reallocation of public resources
and limitations on uses by adding a means of balancing the benefits
to both tideland owners and the public use.64
This balancing test had only an ephemeral influence on Califor-
nia's tideland trust doctrine. Two years after City of Berkeley, the
California Supreme Court abandoned the test in City of Los Angeles
v. Venice Peninsula Properties.6" Applying the Calfornia Fish scru-
tiny, the court ruled that a patent of tideland failed to destroy a pub-
lic trust interest in such land.66 The property in dispute was
primarily reclaimed tideland, as was that involved in City of Berke-
ley. The court, however, did not balance private and public bene-
fits.67 Instead, the court rested its decision upon an analysis of the
chain of title to the lagoon.6
The Venice Peninsula court conducted its analysis along the guide-
eral interest which may potentially serve a broader spectrum of residents. Examples
of the latter include fisheries, harbors, and public parks. 44 Cal. 2d at 205-06, 282
P.2d at 486-87.
59. See, e.g., State v. Superior Ct. of Lake County, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239,
172 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1981) (preservation of public right of access involves preservation
of tideland itself); Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790
(1971) (overdevelopment of tidelands breaches public trust duty to posterity).
60. See Dyer, supra note 2, at 572-75.
61. 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1980).
62. Id at 534-35, 606 P.2d at 373-74, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
63. Id at 536, 606 P.2d at 374, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 339. City of Berkeley held that
tideland developed by a grantee was subject to public use, and no compensation is
required if "the economic use to the grantees [of such tideland] is speculative at best
and is clearly outweighed by the interests of the public." Id
64. Id at 536, 606 P.2d at 373, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
65. 31 Cal. 3d 288, 644 P.2d 792, 182 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1982).
66. Id at 299, 644 P.2d at 798, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 605.
67. See supra note 63.
68. City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Prop., 31 Cal. 3d at 294-98, 644 P.2d
at 795-97, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 602-04.
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lines specified in the Hihn opinion.69 The court concluded that Mex-
ico once held a public trust interest in the disputed lagoon.7" Venice
Peninsula, like Hihn, avoided the issue of congruence in Mexican and
United States public trust interests.7 ' For the Venice Peninsula court,
pre-cession Mexican property law72 was of limited utility in Califor-
nia's tideland trust doctrine.
73
Once the Venice Peninsula court determined that Mexico had held
a public trust interest in the lagoon,"4 application of the tideland trust
doctrine became simple. When the United States assumed this inter-
est,75 the court reasoned, the lagoon became part of the common law
public trust.76 For the Venice Peninsula court, it was the transfer of
this trust interest, not transfer of title to the property, which made the
lagoon trustland.77
Venice Peninsula marks the demise of the prerequisite of navigabil-
69. Id For an analysis of the Hihn opinion, see supra notes 40-43 and accompa-
nying text.
70. 31 Cal. 3d at 298, 644 P.2d at 797-98, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 604-05. The court cited
Moore v. Smaw, 17 Cal. 199 (1861), in making the analogy between established,
transferable sovereign interests and the Mexican trust interest in the lagoon. 31 Cal.
3d at 298, 644 P.2d at 798, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 603.
71. 31 Cal. 3d at 310-12, 644 P.2d at 805-06, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 612-13 (Richardson,
J,, dissenting).
72. See supra note 42.
73. 31 Cal. 3d at 303-04, 644 P.2d at 800-01, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 607-08.
74. Id at 301-03, 644 P.2d at 799-800, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 606-07.
75 See supra note 10.
76. See supra notes 13-14.
77 31 Cal. 3d at 288, 644 P.2d at 796, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 603.
The court overruled dictum in San Diego County Archaeological Soc'y, Inc. v.
Compadres, 81 Cal. App. 3d 923, 146 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1978), indicating that a public
trust interest is an incident of sovereign ownership. Id at 928, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 788.
The Compadres case involved the impending destruction of some Indian artifacts
found on privately owned upland. Compadres rejected the Archaeological Society's
argument applying the public trust doctrine to uplands, stating that "the doctrine has
been restricted to tidelands, navigable waters, and situations where the government or
public in general own the property." Id The Compadres court failed to discuss its
reasons for this restricted scope. The court in Venice Peninsula, however, felt that
such scope would lead to judicial chaos and prognosticated:
[There would develop] a California Mason-Dixon coastline dramatically di-
vided between the north, in which the public trust doctrine is respected, and the
south, where it is unrecognized. A dual system of rights would be created.
Grantees whose title derives from Mexican grants would enjoy title free of the
public trust, whereas those whose title did not originate with Mexico would hold
their land subject to the trust.
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ity in the application of the tideland trust doctrine.78 The Venice Pe-
ninsula court reduced this requirement to a mere formality.79 Once
the definitive test of a tideland trust interest, 0 navigability has be-
come a bootstrap for applying the doctrine to areas of "water-re-
lated" public interest.8 ' The public interest involved in Venice
Peninsula was not navigability per se but potential navigability.
Since the lagoon was only periodically navigable by a small class of
vessels,82 it was subject to a limited easement of public access. Physi-
cal alteration of tidelands, such as the proposed dredging of the la-
goon, 83 can facilitate year-round navigation and thus expand the
public's right of access.84 Thus, potential navigability adds a new di-
City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Prop., 31 Cal. 3d at 304, 644 P.2d at 801, 182
Cal. Rptr. at 608.
The Venice Peninsula court's criticism of Compadres was made on the general level
of the public trust. See id at 299-300, 644 P.2d at 798, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 605. Since
the tideland trust doctrine must comply with general public trust law, the Venice Pe-
ninsula court's rejection of the Compadres sovereign ownership theory affects all
property under the aegis of the California public trust doctrine.
78. See generally Stevens, supra note 16.
79. In light of the lagoon's shallowness, the court in Venice Peninsula strains the
traditional definition of nagigable waters. See supra note 7.
80. See generally M. Scott, supra note 21.
81. See City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Prop., 31 Cal. 3d at 304-06, 644
P.2d at 801-02, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 608-09 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
In the recent case of National Audubon Soe'y v. Superior Ct. of Alpine County, 33
Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983), the California Supreme Court
extended the public trust doctrine to nonnavigable tributaries of navigable waterways.
The question of the applicability of the public trust doctrine to such tributaries arose
in the context of a growing problem in California water law-the competing interests
of the public trust doctrine and the appropriative water rights system. Whereas Ven-
ice Peninsula expanded the concept of navigability by adding a temporal parameter
(ie., the potential forfuture navigability), NationalAudubon Soc)' uses a special pa-
rameter (ie., proximate physical connection with a waterway) in applying the public
trust doctrine to non-navigable waterways. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior
Ct. of Alpine County, 33 Cal. 3d at 429, 658 P.2d at 720-21, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356-57.
82. See supra note 7.
83. The city wanted to dredge Ballona Lagoon, construct sea walls, and make
minor changes in the foreshore. Dredging would permit larger vessels to use the la-
goon, and sea walls would stop tidal flooding of upland properties. City of Los Ange-
les v. Venice Peninsula Prop., 31 Cal. 3d at 293, 644 P.2d at 794, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
84. The expansion of public's right of access to tidelands necessarily involves the
issue of just compensation for the corresponding reduction of the littoral property
owners' exclusionary powers. In Venice Peninsula, the California court did not con-
sider exclusionary powers as coming within the protection of the fifth amendment. In
a similar case, however, the Supreme Court held that the federal government must
pay private owners just compensation before converting a privately owned pond into
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mension to the flexibility of use advocated in Calfornia Fish.85 Mu-
nicipalities may not only modify the present uses of tidelands, but
they may also modify the tideland itself to better serve the public
interest.86
The Venice Peninsula court's allusions to Mexican property law of
pre-cession California belie the court's reluctance to embrace Mexi-
can law as an alternative foundation of the public trust doctrine.87
California courts in growing numbers refer to public use easements
under Mexican law.8" Reference to such residual easements in mod-
em public trust analysis serves to comport public appropriation of
tidelands with fifth amendment due process guarantees. 89 Although
Mexican law in public trust cases is presently limited to access dis-
putes in private littoral property,' that body of law may help clarify
California's constitutional guarantees of public access rights.91
a public marina opening onto the Pacific Ocean. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S 164, 179-80 (1979).
85. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text. Venice Peninsula also argu-
ments the decision of Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr.
790 (1971). The court in Marks stated that "the public uses to which tidelands are
subject are sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs. In administering
the trust, the State is not burdened with an outmoded classification favoring one
mode of utilization over another." Id at 216, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
86. Venice Peninsula represents a quantitative enlargement of the California tide-
land trust doctrine. Considering the large amount of privately owned California litto-
ral property and the number of patents granted for such land during California's
early statehood, Venice Peninsula may have serious implications for hundreds of litto-
ral property owners.
87. For a discussion of the efficacy of Mexican common property law in public
trust cases, see Dyer, supra note 2, at 608-11. For an examination of the Venice Penin-
sula court's construction of Mexican law, see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., State v. Superior Ct. of Lake County, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239,
172 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1981) (title to land between low and high tides voided through
inference of public use easement existing prior to cession); City of Berkeley v. Supe-
rior Ct. of Alameda County, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1980)
(Mexican easement of access inferred); Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d
374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971) (foreshore easement extended to land seaward of very
high tide).
89. See Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162
(1970). See supra note 84.
90. See Dyer, supra note 2, at 611.
91. See Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d at 42, 465 P.2d at 62, 84 Cal. Rptr.
at 174. Gion involved the rights of littoral owners whose property lay in the path of
public ingress and egress to tidelands. Under the California Constitution, "No indi-
vidual . . claiming or possessing frontage . . . of a navigable water in this state,
shall be permitted to exclude the right of way to such water whenever it is required
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Venice Peninsula's impact on the California shoreline depends
upon the tideland trust doctrine's ability to reconcile both due pro-
cess challenges of tideland appropriations and criticism-both judi-
cial and legislative-of major alterations of the shoreline. The
efficacy of Venice Peninsula for purposes of recreational development
lies in the potential transformation of unused tidelands into fruitful
property. Future use of the Venice Peninsula precedent, however, de-
mands a delicate balancing of competing public interests: the recrea-
tional rights of a present generation and the rights of future
generations to an uncompromised shoreline.*
Kevin P. Cronin
*EPILOGUE
In April, 1984, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's decision on narrow grounds in Summa Corp.
v. California ex rel State Lands Comm'n, 104 S. Ct. 1751 (1984).
Justice Rehnquist, who authored the Court's 8-0 decision, focused on
whether California's public trust easement, if it existed, survived the
patent proceedings instituted by petitioner's predecessors-in-interest.
The proceedings were conducted pursuant to the 1851 Act that Con-
gress had enacted to implement the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
1d at 1755-56. The Court barred California from imposing the ease-
ment on the petitioner's tidelands, rejecting California's claim that it
was not required to expressly reserve its easement in the confirmation
proceedings because the easement was a "sovereign" property inter-
est. Id at 1756, 1758.
The Court reasoned that the 1851 Act's purpose was to stabilize
land titles in California, and to provide "parties who possess [land
titles] an opportunity of placing them on the records. . . in a manner
and form that will prevent future controversy." Id (citation omit-
ted). See Venice Peninsula, 31 Cal. 3d 288, 315, 644 P.2d 792, 808,
182 Cal. Rptr. 599, 615 (Richardson, J., dissenting) (asserting that
for any public purpose. . . ." CAL. CONsT. art. XV, § 2. Although the court in Glen
held that an implied easement existed in appellant's property, it based its decision on
the appellant's lack of response to the adverse possession by city residents. The court
acknowledged possible conflicts between art. XV, § 2 of the California Constitution
and the just compensation and due process clauses of the fifth amendment of the
United States Constitution. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d at 44, 465 P.2d at
58-59, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 170-71.
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procedures under the 1851 Act were a "forthright, direct and com-
mon sense" method to resolve title providing California "ample op-
portunity" to assert a public trust interest). In light of the procedures
to confirm title under the Act, and because a public trust easement
would be "substantially in derogation of the fee interest patented to
petitioner's predecessors," 104 S. Ct. at 1755, the Court looked to
other cases involving similar claims made subsequent to patent pro-
ceedings. Justice Rehnquist cited United States v. Coronado Beach
Co., 255 U.S. 472 (1921), and Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 981,(1901),
for the proposition that a state may not collaterally attack a patent
proceeding. 104 S. Ct. at 1757.
The Supreme Court left untouched the California Supreme Court's
conclusion that the state's easement derived from the tideland's po-
tential navigability. Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist did not alter the
California Supreme Court's finding that California received the ease-
ment through transfer of Mexico's property interest. See supra note
77 and accompanying text. Summa Corp. 's significance lies in its sub-
ordination of a state's sovereign property interest to an interest con-
firmed by a federal patent proceeding. The Court's statement of the
conclusiveness of those proceedings, in effect, affords a substantial
protection only to private property owners whose interests exist under
an uncontested federal patent entered pursuant to the 1851 Act.
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